Does inflation harm economic growth? : evidence for the OECD by Andrés Domingo, Javier Angel & Hernando Castellet, Ignacio
DOES INFLATION
HARM ECONOMIC
GROWTH?
EVIDENCE FOR
THE OECD
Javier Andrés
and Ignacio Hernando
Banco de España - Servicio de Estudios
Documento de Trabajo nº 9706
DOES INFLATION 
HARM ECONOMIC 
GROWTH? 
EVIDENCE FOR 
THE OECD 
Javier Andres (*) 
and Ignacio Hernando (**) 
{*} Banco de Espana and Universidad de Valencia. 
{**} Banco de Espana. 
Presented.at the NBER conference on "The Costs and Benefits of Achieving Price Stability", 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (February 20-21, 1997). We are grateful to Palle Ander­
sen, Sean Craig, Juanjo Dolado, Rafael Domenech, Angel Estrada, Frederic Mishkin, Teresa 
Sastre, Javier Valles, Jose Viiials and the participants at the conference for their comments and 
to Francisco de Castro for his excellent research assistance. 
Banco de Espana - Servicio de Estudios 
Documento de Trabajo nO 9706 
In publishing this series the Banco de Espana seeks to disseminate 
studies of interest that will help acquaint readers better 
with the Spanish economy. 
The analyses, opinions and findings of these papers represent 
the views of their authors: they are not necessarily those 
of the Banco de Espana. 
The Banco de Espana is disseminating some of its 
principal reports via INTERNET and INFOViA. 
The respective WWW server addresses are: 
http://www.bde.es and http://www.bde.inf. 
ISSN: 0213-2710 
ISBN: 84-7793-536-X 
Dep6sito legal: M. 12724-1997 
Imprenta del Banco de Espana 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to study the correlation among growth and 
inflation at the OECD level, within the framework of the so called convergence 
equations, and to discuss whether this correlation withstands a number of 
improvements in the empirical models, which try to address the most corrunon 
criticisms on this evidence. The main findings are the following: 1) the negative 
correlation among growth and inflation is not explained by the experience of high­
inflation economies� 2) the estimated costs of inflation are still significant once 
country-specific effects are allowed for in the empirical model; and 3) the observed 
correlation cannot be dismissed on the grounds of reverse causation (from GDP to 
inflation). 

I. Introduction. 
From 1973 until 1984 OECD economies underwent a period of 
macroeconomic distress in which inflation escalated to reach an average rate of 13%, 
three times as high as in the previous decade. Since then, achieving a low and_ stable 
inflation has become the main goal of monetary policies in western economies. This 
move in monetary policy-making rests on the belief, finnly rooted in many 
economists and politicians' minds, that the costs of inflation are non-negligible. so 
that keeping inflation under control pays off in tenns of faster sustainable growth in 
the future. 
The shortage of theoretical models explicitly addressing the issue of the long­
run effects of inflation has not prevented many researchers from trying to estimate 
the costs of inflation. A series of recent papers have tried to assess the long run 
impact of current inflation within the framework of the so called convergence 
equations. These equations can be derived from a theoretical model of economic 
growth and, although the precise channels through which inflation affects growth are 
not always made explicit, they represent several advantages for the purposes at hand. 
First, and foremost, an explicit model reduces the risk of omitting relevant variables. 
Second, convergence equations allow for a variety of effects of inflation, including 
those which reduce accumulation rates and those which undennine the efficiency 
with which productive factors operate. Finally, in this framework a clear distinction 
can be made between level and rate oj growth effects of inflation; this difference 
matters as regards the size and the timing of the costs of inflation. This paper sticks 
to this methodology, whose main shortcoming is that it focuses on long run issues, 
disregarding the short run costs associated to disinflation (the sacrifice ratio). OUT 
purpose is to study the correlation among growth and inflation at the OECD level 
and to discuss whether this correlation withstands a number of improvements in the 
empirical models, which tI)' to address the most common criticisms on this evidence. 
In particular, we aim to answer the following questions: is this correlation explained 
by the experience of high-inflation economies?; are the estimated costs of inflation 
still significant once country-specific effects are allowed for in the empirical model?; 
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can the observed negative correlation be dismissed on the grounds of reverse 
causation (from GOP to inflation)? 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly sununarizes 
the literature dealing with the costs of inflation, the empirical model and the data 
used. In section III we present the estimated convergence equations augmented with 
the rate of inflation, whereas in section IV the empirical model is further augmented 
to allow for cross-country heterogeneity. In these two sections, we test the sensitivity 
of the results to the exclusion of high-inflation countries. In section IV we estimate 
the long run benefits of a pennanent disinflation and address the issue of whether 
the cost of inflation varies with the level of inflation or not. In section V standard 
causality tests are applied to the inflation-growth relationship. Section VI concludes 
with some additional remarks. The main results of the paper can be summarized as 
follows. Even low or moderate inflation rates (as the ones we have witnessed within 
the OEeD) have a negative temporary impact upon long-term growth rates; this 
effect is significant and generates a permanent reduction in the level of per capita 
income. Inflation not only reduces the level of investment but also the efficiency 
with which productive factors are used. The estimated benefit of a permanent 
reduction in the inflation rate by a percentage point is an increase in the steady-state 
level of per capita income which ranges from 0.5% to 2%. Although the ·size varies 
somewhat across specifications (as well as across different levels of inflation), the 
correlation among inflation and future income is never found positive. This result 
holds across different sub-samples (even excluding high-inflation counnies) and is 
also robust to alternative econometric specifications. In particular, inflation Granger­
causes income and the current and lagged correlation between these two variables 
remains significant when we control for country-specific variables (such as the 
accumulation rates) and time invariant effects. 
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II. The theoretical framework. 
11.1 International evidence. 
The negative effects of inflation have been studied in the context of the 
models of economic growthl, in which the continuous increase of per capita income 
is the outcome of capital accumulation along with technological progress. The 
uncertainty associated to a high and volatile unanticipated inflation has been found 
to be one of the main detenninants of the rate of return of capital and investment 
(Bruno (1993), Pindyck and Solimano (1993». But even fully anticipated inflation 
may reduce the rate of return of capital given the non-neutralities built into most 
industrialized countries' tax systems (Jones and Manuelli (1993), Feldstein (1996». 
Besides. inflation undennines the confidence of domestic and foreign investors abo�t 
the future course of monetary policy. Inflation also affects the accumulation of other 
determinants of growth such as human capital or investment in R+D; this cbannel 
of influence is known as the accumulation or investment effect of inflation on 
growth. 
But, over and above these effects, inflation also worsens the long-run 
macroeconomic perfonnance of market economies by reducing total factor 
productivity. This cbannel, also known as the efficiency channel, is barder to 
fonnalize in a theoretical model2, nonetheless its importance in the transmission 
mechanism from inflation towards lower growtb cannot be denied. A bigb level of 
inflation induces a frequent change in prices which may be costly for firms (menu 
cosL,) and reduces the optimal level of cash holdings by consumers (shoe-leather 
costs). It also generates larger forecast errors by distorting the infonnation contents 
of prices, encouraging economic agents to spend more time and resources in 
gatbering information and protecting themselves against the damages caused by price 
I See Orphan ides and Solow (1990), De Gregorio (1993), Roubini and Sala-i­
Martin (1995) amongst otbers. 
, Briault (1995) surveys the literature on tbese effects. 
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instability, hence endangering the efficient allocation of resources. Although some 
theoretical models analyze the components of the efficiency channel in more detail, 
it is difficult 'to discriminate among them in aggregate empirical growth equations. 
Thus, we shall not pursue this issue further here and we shall tum our attention to 
the empirical evidence. 
Several authors have found a negative correlation between growth and 
inflation. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) estimate a growth equation with cross­
section data and find that the effect of inflation on the growth rate is negative, 
although it loses explanatory power when the rate of investment is also included in 
the regression. This would indicate that the effect of inflation mainly manifests itself 
in a reduction in investment but not in the productivity of capital. Grier and Tullock 
(1989) estimate a model that excludes the rate of investment and includes several 
measures of nominal instability (such as the inflation rate, the acceleration of prices 
and the standard deviation of inflation). The results differ according to the group of 
countries considered, but for the OECD only the variability of inflation seems to 
have a significant and negative effect on growth. 
More recently, the study of the long-run influence of inflation has progressed 
within the framework of convergence equations developed by Barro and. Sala-i­
Martin (1991 )'. Fischer (1991, 1993) reports a significant influence of several short­
tenn macroeconomic indicators, and in particular inflation, on the growth rate. Cozier 
and Selody (1992) estimate cross-section convergence equations for different samples 
and find a fairly large negative effect of inflation on income at the OECD level. 
These authors conclude that inflation affects the level rather than the growth rate of 
, Several exceptions, however, are worth noting: the studies of Grimes (1991) 
for the OECD, Smyth (1994) for the United States, Cardoso and Fishlow (1989) who 
use a panel of five-year averages for 18 Latin American countries, and Burdekin, 
Goodwin, Salamun and Willell (1994) and Bruno (1993). In all these studies, a 
significant negative effect of inflation on growth is reported. On the other hand, 
Bullard and Keating (1995) find that the long-run oulput response to permanent 
inflation shocks in a SV AR model is zero, for most advanced economies. 
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productivity and that the impact of inflation variability is weak'. This finding 
coincides with the result obtained more recently by Sarro (1995, 1996) in a sample 
of 120 countries, who reports a negative long-run effect of inflation using alternative 
instruments to correct for the endogeneity of inflation. The general conclusion of 
these and other studies (De Gregorio (1992a, 1992b and 1996), Motley (1994» is 
consistent with the negative correlation between inflation and income in the long run 
suggested in the theoretical literature. However, the consensus in this respect is far 
from absolute, and several authors have criticised these findings, arguing that the 
lack of a fully developed theoretical framework makes it difficult to interpret the 
empirical correlations and that even these are not robust to changes in the 
econometric specification. The latter argument is developed by Levine and Rench 
(1992), Levine and Zervos (1993) and Clark (1993). Levine and Renelt carry out an 
exhaustive sensitivity analysis among broad set of regressors in growth equations and 
conclude that the statistical significance (and even the sign) of most of these 
variables (inflation among them) is not invariant to changes in the information set'. 
Nor do these results, in tum, escape criticism. Sala-i-Martin (1994) argues that the 
problem of finding a macroeconomic variable whose effect is invariant to alternative 
specifications of the convergence equation should not be taken to mean that this 
influence is absent, but should instead be viewed as a sign of the difficulty of finding 
indicators that can adequately capture this effect for any period and gmup of 
countries. Gylfasson and Herbertsson (1996) find that the inflation rate is robust to 
changes in the conditioning set, whereas Andres, Domenech and Molinas (1996) 
show that, for the OECD as a whole, short run macroeconomic variables are as 
robust (if not more) as the rates of accumulation in explaining economic gmwth and 
that this holds for alternative conditioning sets as well as across different time 
periods. 
, Judson and Orphan ides (1996) measure the variability of inflation as the 
variance of the quarterly rate for each counhy and find that it is negatively correlated 
with growth. These authors also find a significant negative effect of the level of 
inflation. They use annual data and do not include initial GDP among the regressors. 
, McCandless and Weber (1995) conclude also that the cross-counhy correlation 
among inflation and growth is zero. 
-
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11.2. The effect of inOation in convergence equations. 
There are a number of advantages in approaching the correlation between 
inflation and growth within the framework of the convergence equations as proposed 
by Sarro and Sala-i-Martin (199 1), which represent the main empirical proposition 
of growth models with constant returns'. In this paper we do not intend to test any 
particular model of economic growth, nor the use of the convergence equation means 
that the exogenous growth model is the only possible representation of the evolution 
of OEeD economies in the long run. As Gylfason and Herbertsson (1996) have 
pointed out, this equation might encompass the empirical implications of many 
endogenous growth models. The main advantage of this specification is that it 
systematically captures most of the factors that have been usually considered as 
detenninants of growth, reducing the risk of omitting relevant regressors entailed in 
ad hoc specifications'. The technology is represented by the following production 
function of constant returns (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992), 
- (A L P "HY Y, - t ,) K, t (1) 
Total factor productivity (�) grows at the constant exogenous rate <P. whereas fixed 
capital (K) and human capital (H) grow in proportion to the output assigned for their 
accumulation'. Assuming that the depreciation rates of both factors are the same, it 
is possible to derive the following equation of growth between two moments in time: 
, De Gregorio (1993) and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) provide more 
elaborate models of the interaction between inflation and growth. 
, In particular, unlike those equations that do not include the catching-up 
component, the convergence equation provides a way of controlling the level of per 
capita income when analysing the detenninants of its growth rate. This turns out to 
be of crucial importance to obtain a significant correlation between growth and 
inflation. 
'In the original formulation of Solow (1956), the rate of technological progress 
is exogenous, although in more recent models it can be explained by the set of 
resources assigned to research, market size, leaming-by-doing, etc. 
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121 
where y represents the logarithm of per capita income in the period indicated by the 
subscript. and y' represents its steady-state value. Expression [2] indicates that the 
growth rate of an economy will have a component determined by the growth in 
factor productivity, q" and another resulting from the economy's propensity to move 
to its steady-state level if, for some reason (shocks, initial conditions, etc.), it lies 
outside. A is the rate at which the economy closes the gap between its current 
income and its potential or steady-state level'. This level is, in tum, detennined by 
the parameters of the production function and by the rates of accumulation of the 
productive factors: 
where s't is the logarithm of the rate of investment, S'h represents the logarithm of 
the rate of accumulation of human capital, and n' is the growth rate of the 
population, all evaluated at their steady-state level; Ii is the depreciation rate of 
capital which will be assumed equal to 3%, while the two constants combine 
different parameters of the model and the starting level of technology (AT). 
This structure allows us to test the different hypotheses considered in this 
paper. First, the presence of the rates of factor accumulation in [3] is useful to 
discriminate between the two channels through which macroeconomic imbalances 
can affect the growth rate. Thus, if inflation reduces total factor productivity, we 
could expect a significant coefficient of the rate of inflation in equation [5]. In.this 
case, the productivity index (A,) might be assumed to evolve as in [4] (Cozier and 
Selody ( 1992», which reflects the influence of the inflation rate (It) and its 
variability (0): 
• This rate can be written as: A=(l-IX-y)(n'+<I>+6). 
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The empirical specification is then given by: 
YT., -YT = tPt + (1-0 -1<) [0 -YT+tPT +1', "T+1'20T+ P -'(as;' +ys;" -(a +y)/og(n; +tP+� »)] 151 
However, if inflation influenced growth solely through its impact on investment (s,.), 
its coefficient in [5] would not be significantlO• Unless when it is necessary we 
shall not impose the parametric restrictions in the previous equations and we shall 
focus in the linear version [5'] instead, 
Second, the exogenous growth model specifies the determinants of both the 
long-run level of per capita income and of the sustained growth Tate. Inflation can 
affect one andlor the other, although the implications in terms of welfare are 
different". According to the specification of equation [4], the impact of inflation 
basically impinges on the potential level of income, but not on sustained growth 
(represented by 4». To examine the latter possibility, we shall also consider an 
alternative specification, [4'], which allows for the influence of inflation on the 
long-run growth rate12: 
14'1 
such that the equation to be estimated would be represented by: 
10 In this case, the impact of inflation on growth in the long run should be 
evaluated by estimating investment equations. 
" See Thomthon (1996) for a discussion of this issue. 
Il This is the specification proposed by Motley ( 1994). The variability of 
inflation is excluded in order to simplify the expression. 
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YT.,-YT = (4)+4>',,)< + (1_.-") [Q -YT+(4) +4>',,)T +1', "T+P -'(as;' +ys;" -(a +y)/og(n; +4>+6»)] (6( 
In the next section we estimate the elasticity of growth with respect to inflation in 
models [5], [5'] and [6]. 
Our observations are four·year averages of OECD annual variables. OUf data 
set is described at length in Daban, Domenech and Molinas ( 1996) who use OECD 
1 990 purchasing power parities to homogenize OECD National Accounts from 1 960 
to 1992. When making real income comparisons among a set of countries, we must 
be aware of the properties of the data elaborated for that pUlJlOse. In particular, the 
more transitive we want our comparisons to be, the more the reference basket of 
goods has to depart from the most representative sample of items for each country. 
Since we restrict the analysis to the OECD, we avoid the use of data sets designed 
to homogenize infonnation from a much larger set of countries (as the one in the 
Penn World Table Mark 5, PWT 5, (Summers and Heston, 1 991». 
III. Estimation or the effect or inDation. 
Tables I and 2 show the instrumental variables estimates of the steady-state 
and the convergence equations, using one and two-periods-lagged regressors as 
instruments. The results are quite robust, both in the linear and in the non-linear 
specifications, as regards the effect of inflation. Linear models (equation [5']) are 
shown in Table I. The models in columns I and 2 of Table I correspond to different 
versions of the convergence equation. As predicted by the neoclassical model, the 
parameter of initial per capita income is negative and highly significant, both when 
steady-state variables are included (conditional convergence) and when they are not 
(unconditional convergence). In column 2, the coefficients of the input accumulation 
rates have the expected sign, although the one for human capital is non-significant. 
The estimated parameter of the trend, which according to the theoretical model is 
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approximating the rate of technological progress, has an unexpected negative sign13. 
On the other hand, the trend coefficient has the expected positive sign in the steady­
state equation (columns 3 and 4), but the values of the coefficients of the 
accumulation rates suggest a far too large share of human capital in the production 
function. 
When the inflation rate and its variability (proxied by the Pearson coefficient) 
are included, the rest of the parameters do not change significantly. The coefficient 
of the inflation rate is negative and significant, both in the convergence and in the 
steady-state equation, whereas no significant effect is found from the variability of 
inflation. Thus, the equations presented hereafter exclude this variable. When the 
factor accumulation rates are included (columns 2 and 4) the size of the inflation 
effect is smaller than when they are omitted (columns I and 3), but it is still 
significant. These results suggest that there are two channels by which inflation 
influences growth: first, through a reduction in the propensity to invest, and second, 
through a reduction in the efficiency in the use of inputs. 
Non-linear models (equation [5]) are shown in Table 2. The estimated 
parameters of the accumulation rates in the steady-state equation (column 1) are 
quite far from the usually obtained in the empirical literature, the low value of a 
being particularly remarkable. The effect of inflation is negative and significant. The 
estimated coefficients in the convergence equation (column 2) look more reasonable, 
pointing towards a technology of similar factor shares ({I/3, 1/3/ 1 /3}), with an 
implicit rate of convergence around 2.7%. Again, the effect of inflation is negative 
and significant. 
!l A possible interpretation for this result is that the trend may be capturing the 
process of sustained reduction in the rate of growth of per capita income suffered by 
OECD countries during part of the sample period. We have tried alternative 
characterizations of technological progress: first, including time dummies instead of 
the linear trend and, second, imposing a rate of technological progress of 2%. The 
estimated coefficients, including that of inflation, do not change significantly. These 
results are not reported to save space. 
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Additionally. some tests of the sensitivity of the inflation coefficient to the 
sample definition have been performed. in order to ascertain if the negative 
correlation among inflation and income is driven by the presence of some high­
inflation countries. The most noticeable change in the estimated coefficient takes 
place when Iceland is excluded from the sample. In such case (column 3 of Table 
2) the correlation among inflation and growth is almost twice as high as when it is 
included. This is not surprising since Iceland being the countty with the second 
highest average inflation within the OEeD, is also a high-income fast-growth 
economy which may be generating a downwards bias (in the absolute value of) the 
growth-inflation correlation. We have proceeded to estimate the model for different 
sub-samples. according to their average inflation. The results, depicted in Chart I ,  
indicate that, if anything, the coefficient o f  inflation i n  the convergence equation is 
higher (in absolute value) and more significant for low-inflation countries. 
The negative effect of inflation on per capita income seems to be robust both 
in the steady-state and in the convergence equation. Although the negative influence 
of inflation on per capita income is well established. the effect on the sustainable 
growth rate is less clear. If the inflation rate is a determinant of steady-state per 
capita income (yo) it should also appear in the convergence equation. But it is not 
clear whether the negative coefficient in this equation points to an effect on the level 
or on the growth rate of output. To discriminate between these effects we have 
estimated equation [6], allowing for an effect of inflation both on the steady-state 
level of income (�) and on the permanent component of the growth rate (<1>'). Both 
these coefficients are negative and significant when they are introduced individually, 
but when they are jointly included in the model (column 4) the effect on the trend 
component takes an unexpected positive sign. This would indicate that the negative 
effect of inflation impinges upon the level of per capita income but not on the 
sustainable rate of growth of the economy. Thus, the impact on the growth rate is 
transitory (in the medium run), as long as convergence is under way. 
Summing up, the analysis in this section, in accordance with other studies, 
supports the evidence of an adverse influence of inflation on growth. As regards the 
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size of this effect, if we take the coefficient in column 3 of Table 2 as a reliable 
estimate of the long-run effect of inflation upon growth, an increase in average 
inflation by one percentage point reduces per capita growth by 0.08 points per year. 
This fall in the growth rate is not permanent but it lasts for a long period leading to 
a pennanent reduction in steady-state per capita income of 2.5% 14, However, 
before to draw any policy implication out of these figures it is convenient to take a 
closer look at the relationship between inflation and growth, trying to correct for 
some biases that might arise in specifications like the ones studied so far. 
IV. Country-specific effects and the cost of inflation. 
There are several reasons to include individual effects in convergence 
equations estimated with multi-country data sets. Most empirical analyses of 
economic growth have relied on the use of infonnation for wide groups of countries. 
This makes possible to focus on the low-frequency properties of the data, taking time 
series averages and still avoiding a severe shortage of degrees of freedom. However, 
this approach imposes a very strong restriction, namely that the data for all the 
economies of the sample stem from the same theoretical distribution, i.c. the 
technological parameters are homogeneous across countries. This assumption is 
seldom explicitly tested, although its empirical implications may be very 
importantls. The existence of technological differences in the rates of technical 
progress or, as it is more likely, in the initial conditions of each country, would lead 
to the presence of idiosyncratic effects in growth equations. If these and other 
country timepinvariant characteristics affect the growth-inflation relationship, it would 
render the lagged regressors inappropriate as instruments in growth equations (Barro 
(1996». The consideration of individual effects in the constant term (Knight, Loayza 
\. When Iceland is included in the sample, these figures are 0.03 and 1,1% 
respectively. 
" See Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
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and Villanueva ( 1 993), Islam ( 1995» or in a more general way (Andres, Bosca and 
Domenech ( 1996)) might then alter significantly some of the main results of the 
empirical growth literature. 
In this section, we test whether the estimated negative effect of inflation on 
growth is biased due to the omission of these country-specific (time-invariant) 
effects. The main results are summarized in Table 3. In column (I), the linear model 
(equation [5']) has been "stimated under the assumption that the omitted individual 
effects are not correlated with the regressors. The random effects estimates, and in 
particular the coefficient of the inflation rate, resemble very much those of the basic 
model depicted in column (2) of Table I. Nevertheless, the reasons to include 
country-specific effects in the model suggest that the assumption of non correlation 
among these and the regressors might not be appropriate in this setting. Thus, in 
what follows we focus on the fixed effect estimates, which we compute including 
dummies in the linear convergence equation. All the models have been estimated by 
instrumental variables. When we add a dummy variable for each country (column 
2) the explanatory power of most regressors changes, as compared with the models 
in the previous section. In particular, while inflation still has a negative effect on 
income its t-statistic is now lower (_ 1 . 16)". The changes in the rest of the model 
are far more radical though. Firstly, whereas the negative trend coefficient was an 
unappealing feature of the models in section III, this coefficient now becomes 
positive and significant, with a reasonable point estimate orO.03. Secondly, the point 
estimates of the technological coefficients are now either non-significant or wrongly 
signed. In fact, excluding the accumulation rates from the equations, the negative 
correlation between growth and inflation becomes highly significant with a t-statistic 
of -2.29 (column 3). Finally, several country dummies are not different from zero, 
which means that the model might be ove'l'arametrized. 
" It must be noticed that the fixed effect estimate of the coefficient of inflation 
is still significant at the 5% level, if we focus in the low inflation countries (LJ). 
This coefficient is lower and weakly significant for the sub-sample of all countries 
but Iceland (HI-ICL) with inflation above the OECD average. 
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The search for a more parsimonious specification proceeds along the 
following steps. Starting from the model with a dummy variable for each country, 
the non-significant dummy variables have been removed, setting aside the one with 
the lowest t-statistic each time. As a second step. these excluded variables have been 
added again, one at a time, retaining those with a t-ratio greater than 1.517. Every 
time a dummy variable is added back into the model, the process is reinitiated. This 
procedure does not involve the analysis of every single possible specification 
according to all the combinations of country-specific constants. However, it provides 
a model selection procedure that allows us to test, at least twice, the marginal 
significance of each dummy variable: first, against a more general model (with all 
the country-specific dummies) and next against a more restricted one. The model in 
column 4 summarizes the final outcome of this specification process. The results do 
not change very much with respect to those in column I, except in that now the 
coefficient of the inflation rate is negative and significant and its size is similar to 
that obtained for the model without individual effects. Furthermore, this result is 
quite robust to the set of country-specific dummies included in the regression. The 
same search process has been also carried out for different sub-samples with 
different average inflation rates. The point estimates of the inflation coefficient, 
along with its confidence interval, are depicted in Chart 2. The coefficient of 
inflation turns out to be larger and more significant whenever high inflation countries 
are not considered. Hence, as it was the case in models without country dummies, 
the estimated correlation between inflation and growth (or income) does not depend 
on the presence of a group of high inflation countries in the sample. 
Taking column 4 as a starting point, in the model in column 5 individual 
dummies are clustered into country-group dummy variables. The t-statistic of the 
17 If the threshold level of the t-ratio is 2.0, the final specification is more 
parsimonious. Nevertheless, the estimated long run coefficient of inflation does not 
depart very much from that in column 4. 
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inflation rate increases again (up to -3.99)1&. It is quite remarkable that the negative 
and highly significant influence of inflation on growth during rather long periods 
survives all these changes in the specification. In fact, it turns out to be, along with 
the initial per capita GOP, the most robust variable of the model. The country groups 
in column 5 have been defined according to the size of the individual effect. Greece 
shows an individual effect that is clearly negative (-0.3 1 )  as compared with the 
excluded counniesl', followed by Turkey (-0.29), Ireland and Portugal (-0.22), 
Spain (-0.15), New Zealand, Finland and the United Kingdom (-0.05). On the other 
hand, Canada and Germany (0.04), Iceland (0.08) and Switzerland, Luxembourg and 
the United States (0. 1 )  display a positive individual effect on the growth rate. The 
estimated individual effects reveal a systematic pattern which, if ignored, could have 
led to a bias in the estimated effect of inflation. The individual effect is strongly 
correlated with the level of per capita income achieved at the end of the sample 
period. Thus, omitting the individual effect, the model would underestimate the 
growth of the richest countries overestimating that of the poorest countries. Since 
there is a negative correlation, at the OECD level, between per capita income in 
1993 and the average inflation rate, excluding the individual effects is a source of 
potential upwards bias in the estimation of the effect of inflation. Indeed, although 
the estimated coefficient of inflation remains largely unchanged, as compared with 
that in Table I, there is, nevenheless a significant change in the point estimate of the 
long-run effect of inflation once country-specific dummies are included in the model. 
The coefficient of initial GDP is now almost five times as large as the one in Tables 
I and 2, thus the estimated long-run cost of inflation is now lower. A permanent 
increase in one percentage point leads to a 0.75% permanent fall in output. This time 
though the transition period is much shoner since a higher coefficient of initial GDP 
means that convergence to the steady-state is much faster too. 
1M As in column 2, the coefficients for the input accumulation rates are not 
significant. The exclusion of these variables does not worsen substantially the fit of 
the equation and funher increases the significance level of the inflation rate. 
19 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Italy, Japan. 
Norway and Sweden. 
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Although OECD economies share certain common institutional features, their 
inflation perfonnances are rather different. Once we have a more accurate estimate 
of the long-run cost of inflation we can address the issue of whether this cost varies 
according to the level of inflation or not. The different perspectives adopted to 
analyze the linearity of the inflation effect have led to contradictory results. For 
instance, Sarro ( 1995), estimating different coefficients for different levels of 
inflatiqn, finds a greater effect of inflation on growth the greater the inflation 
level". Motley ( 1994), estimating the growth model for different sub-samples, 
concludes the opposite. We have tried these two approaches in equation [5'] and 
found that they also yield somewhat different results for the OECD, although the 
coefficients of inflation in different sub-samples where not very precisely estimated. 
In general, though, the coefficient corresponding to lower inflation rates tends to be 
higher although with a lower t ratio. This would indicate that the benefits of lower 
inflation are indeed higher at low rates, although the functional form might be 
inappropriate to capture this result. As an alternative, we have estimated the basic 
model allowing for a nonlinear effect of inflation on growth. Including 1t and i' both 
coefficients are significant while the positive coefficient on rr? indicates that the 
marginal cost of inflation is positive but decreasing with its level. Two alternative 
specifications which allow for a falling marginal cost of inflation have also been 
tried. In these, inflation is represented by 10g(1t) and the ratio" (rr/(I+n», 
respectively. In all the specifications tried (with country dummies, excluding Iceland, 
and so on) these equations perform better than the ones with the level of inflation. 
A further test for linearity has been carried out in the model in 10g(1t). In part 
A of Table 4, a different coefficient is allowed for 10g(1t) depending on its level. 
These elasticities are always negative and significant but not statistically different. 
As an alternative approach, the homogeneity assumption may be relaxed by 
estimating the convergence equation for different sub-samples. This approach allows 
all the parameters, and not only the coefficient of inflation, to vary across sub-
" Although the null of linearity cannot be rejected (see also Sarro (1996». 
11 Gylfason and Herbertsson (1996) propose this nonlinear transformation. 
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samples. The results are summarized in pan B of Table 4. The effect of inflation is 
negative and significant both for low (and very low) as well as for high (and very 
high) inflation countries and the coefficient of log(n) is similar across different sub­
sample specifications22, The results of these two approaches lead us to conclude 
that the elasticity of income with respect to inflation does not change significantly 
with the level of inflation. If anything, this tells us that it pays more in the case of 
a low-inflation country than in a high-inflation one to reduce the inflation rate by a 
given amount. By the same token, it is more costly for a low-inflation country to 
concede an additional (and permanent) point of inflation than it is for a country with 
a higher starting rate2l. 
Table 5 shows the long-run impact upon income of a one percentage point 
pennanent reduction of inflation for a variety of specifications of the effect of 
inflation. All models include country-specific constants and we report results for the 
OECD as a whole and also excluding Iceland. The estimated long-run benefit of a 
reduction of inflation from 20% to 19% varies from 0.30% to 0.75%, with an 
average value of 0.5%. At lower inflation levels (from 4% to 3%), the benefit of the 
same reduction in inflation is higher, with an average I % increase in steady-state 
12 The coefficient of initial GDP is also similar across the specifications in Table 
4B. Thus, the hypothesis of homogeneity in the long-run elasticity cannot be rejected 
either. 
2) The exercises on Table 4 have been carried out for different inflation regimes 
and also for different specifications of the equation and the inflation teIm. l'he 
overall picture that comes out of these exercises is the same. The coefficient of the 
inflation tenn is negative in most cases and it tends to be bigger (in absolute value) 
at low inflation rates, although with lower t-statistics as well. In a few specifications 
the coefficient for very low inflation rates (below 3-4%) is positive, although never 
significant. This issue deselVos a more careful scrutiny, since it might well be that 
inflation ceases to be costly at all at very low levels. Since we have very few data 
points with inflation under 3% in our sample, we have not been able to pursue this 
further. Sarel ( 1995) concludes that the cut-<>fT point might be at an 8% rate of 
inflation. However, both the model and the data used differ from ours in several 
respects. 
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income. These estimated values are all rather similar except for the specification in 
logs which overrates the benefits of disinflation at low inflation levels. 
These benefits seem lower than others reported in the literature, but it must 
be noticed that they are obtained in equations displaying higher than usual 2-3% 
convergence rate. This is most important since it means that the transition period 
until the increase in GDP actually takes place is shorter; thus, it would not take the 
representative economy much time to reap the full benefits of a sustained 
disinflation. In Table 6 we compare the cost of inflation estimated in the basic model 
(column 3, Table 2) with the one obtained in the model with country specific effects 
(column 4, Table 3). The estimated benefit from a permanent reduction in the 
inflation rate by one percentage point is higher in the former (2.5% versus 0.75%). 
Nevertheless, since this is a steady-state effect and the convergence rates also differ 
across models (2.5% versus 13%), the relevant comparison should be made in 
present value terms, which makes the outcome dependent on the discount rate. 
According to the figures in this example, for discount rates slightly above 4% the 
benefit of disinflation is larger in models with faster dynamics, despite the lower 
coefficient of the inflation rate in the convergence equation. Hence, the present value 
of the per capita income gain might well be within the range of those found'in other 
studies. 
V. Analysis of causality. 
The models studied in previous sections can generate a non negligible bias 
in the estimation of the influence of inflation on growth by focusing on the 
contemporaneous correlation between these two variables. Inflation and growth are 
the joint outcome of the way in which an economy responds to different shocks. If 
demand shocks predominate, a positive association between GDP growth and 
inflation can be expected, whereas the association will be negative in response to 
supply shocks. Also, even if we consider the possibility of a true influence of one 
variable over the other, the theoretical literature presents arguments in favour of 
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causality in both directions. For this reason, the contemporaneous correlation 
between growth and inflation may not be very informative as to the existence and 
magnitude of a real cost associated with inflation. 
In fact, it might be the case that the estimated negative correlation between 
inflation and growth is driven by the predominance of negative supply shocks during 
the sample period. To test this possibility we have estimated the linear version of the 
convergence equation for two periods: a first one (1961-1972 and 1989-1992), where 
demand shocks predominated, and a second one (1973-1988), where supply shocks 
have been probably more significant" . The results of this split are shown in Table 
7, where we present only the coefficient on inflation for both the OLS and the IV 
estimation. As expected, the IV coefficient is higher (lower), in absolute value, than 
the OLS coefficient for the first (second) period given the nature of the expected bias 
in each case. But in all cases, the coefficients are negative and significant, meaning 
that the negative supply shocks that hit the OEeD economies during most of the 
second half of the sample period are not primarily responsible for the estimated 
negative correlation association between inflation and growth. If this had been the 
case, we ought to find a positive coefficient for the first period, at least in the OLS 
estimation. The finding of negative coefficients for both periods strengthens the view 
that there is indeed a genuine negative effect of inflation upon growth that does not 
rely on the existence of supply shocks determining simultaneously inflation and 
growth. 
In order to pursue this issue more thoroughly, this section analyses the 
statistical causality, as formulated by Granger, of inflation to growth and vice-versa. 
This perspective is broader than that of convergence equations in several ways. First, 
the analysis of causality focuses on the study of non-contemporaneous effects of one 
variable on the other. This is precisely the influence of inflation on growth predicted 
by the theoretical models: an influence that does not operate in the short run but that 
" Similar results were obtained when we split the period up in other two parts: 
1961-1976, for demand shocks predominance, and 1977-1992, for supply shocks 
predominance. 
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takes time to show instead. Second, in using a more flexible specification, we avoid 
the imposition of the parametric restrictions of the neo-classical growth model which 
might make the correlation that concerns us here less clear. The analysis of causality 
carried out in this section does not put theoretical growth models aside. Economic 
theory suggests a series of gmwth determinants that can be incoI]lOrated into the 
information set in the tests of causality. 
To analyse the causality from the rate of inflation to the level of per capita 
income", a test is run on the joint significance of {d., .. .  <I.,} in the model: 
Y, = A + C(L)y, + D(L)", + G(L)X, + u, 171 
where Y., ft. are vectors (24xl )  of current observations of the logarithm of per capita 
GDP and of the rate of inflation, respectively, for the 24 member countries of the 
OEeD, X. is a vector of additional regressors, suggested by gmwth theory and A is 
a vector (24xl )  of constants. e(L), D(L) and G(L) are matrices of order (24x24) in 
which the elements outside the main diagonal are zero and the element within the 
main diagonal is a lagged polynomial of order p such as (for elL), for example): 
The rejection of the null hypothesis that the d,'s are zero indicates that current 
inflation helps to reduce the mean-squared error in the prediction of per capita 
income and, therefore, that n causes y in the Granger sense. Likewise, the causality 
from the gmwth rate to inflation is tested through the joint significance of {e., . . ... } 
in: 
", = B + E(L)Ay, + F(L)", + H(�)X, + " 181 
where E(L), F(L) and H(L) are matrices of a structure similar to C(L) and B is a 
" Testing the causality from the rate of inflation to the gmwth rate only entails 
adding a linear restriction on the coefficients in C(L), and writring per capita income 
in first differences. The results of the causality tests to the growth rate are quite 
similar to those of the causality tests to the level of per capita income and will not 
be reported here to save space. 
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vector (24x I )  of constants. The rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
eJ are zero indicates that Ay causes n. 
The elements of the matrices A and B, as well as the coefficients of the 
lagged polynomials (in C(L), D(L), E(L), F(L), G(L) and H(L» , will be assumed 
to be homogeneous ' among countries unless expressly stated otherwise. The 
estimation of [7] and [8] raises several methodological issues", the most important 
one being the possibility that some variables are non-stationary, in which case 
exclusion tests do not have a standard distribution. In the case at hand, both per 
capita income and the rate of inflation are, for most countries in the sample, 000-
stationary. There are several ways in which the hypothesis of causality between 
integrated variables can be tested making use of statistics with asymptotic standard 
distribution. These procedures basically consist of a re-parametrisation of the model 
in order to obtain stationary Tt?gressors27. The method proposed by Dolado and 
Liitkepohl ( 1 996) does not require a search for possible cointegration vectors which 
is quite often a hazardous task in panel data models. These authors propose the 
estimation of a V AR in levels of order p+l. The exclusion test perfonned on the p 
first lags is thus distributed asymptotically as an F, whereby the loss of efficiency 
by the over-parametrisation of the model is compensated by the test's consistency 
and simpiicitylJ;. The application of this method requires knowing the true order, 
p, of the V AR. In this paper, rather than discussing the structure of the lags in detail, 
we present results for a sufficiently broad range of lags that ensure the stationarity 
of the residuals. 
26 Since this section applies annual data relating to the variables of interest for 
the 24 OECD countries, it depans from the traditional approach in the empirical 
literature on growth, which avoids using annual infonnation. Nevertheless, an 
increasing number of studies tend to use raw annual data. Moreover, in the dynamic 
analysis of causality, models based on time averages can be considered as restricted 
versions of models that use annual data. As regards the role of individual effects in 
multi-country regressions, we shall take them into account in this section by 
considering several specifications in which vectors A and B include a different 
constant for each country (a" b,). 
21 See Sims, Stock and Watson (1990). 
" For an application of this method, see Andres, Boscli and Domenech (1996). 
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The exclusion test in [7] has been perfonned for ten different structures of 
lags (p going from 3 to 1 2) and for five sets of additional regressors (XJ". Thus, 
the causality from the rate of inflation to the level of per capita income has been 
tested in 50 specifications. Table 8 summarises the results of these tests, that can be 
read as follows. In 47 cases, the null hypothesis that the inflation coefficients are 
jointly non-significant, and hence that inflation does not cause income, can be 
rejected at the 5% level. Funhennore, the sum of the lagged coefficients of inflation 
is negative in all 50 cases. This would imply that higher inflation today anticipates 
lower income in the future. However, the evidence of a long run effect of inflation 
upon income is not unequivocal since the sum of the coefficients of the inflation lags 
is significantly different from zero (at the 10% level) in just a half of the cases. This 
is worrisome since a non-significant long run coefficient can be interpreted as if the 
effect of inflation on growth is not pennane"t, casting some doubts on the validity 
of the correlation found in previous sections. 
Table 8 indicates in parentheses the number of specifications corresponding 
to the model with the largest set of additional regressors: individual effects, lagged 
accumulation rates and several macroeconomic variables. Many authors have studied 
the relationship between long-tenn growth and the shon-tenn perfonnance of 
economies1O. The main argument on which this relationship rests is that the shocks 
29 These five sets are the following: I )  includes neither additional regressors 
(!l;=0) nor constant individual effects; 2) includes individual constant effects so that 
A is a vector of different constants, one for each country; 3) incorporates, in addition 
to individual effects, several other regressors such as a linear trend, the savings ratio, 
the rate of schooling and the growth rate of the population, all of them 
contemporaneous; 4) as the previous set, but with the first lag (instead of the current) 
accumulation rates; and 5) as the previous set plus current expons growth and the 
first lag of money growth, expons growth, public consumption and public deficit as 
a percentage of GOP. 
JO See Levine and Renelt ( 1 992), Fischer ( 1 993) and Andres, Domenech and 
Molinas ( 1 996), among others, for alternative views of the influence of 
macroeconomic shocks on growth. 
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hitting an economy or the way economic policy is conducted influence the agents' 
accumulation decisions and the way markets operate. Thus, a succession of negative 
shocks or an inadequately designed fiscal or monetary policy may have effects that 
go beyond the short term, affecting potential output and sustained growth. If this 
argument is correct, the causal interpretation of the estimated correlation between 
inflation and growth could be called into question. The estimated correlation between 
growth and inflation could be due simply to the fact that inflation approximates the 
impact of other macroeconomic variables with which it is strongly correlated. Those 
specifications that include other macroeconomic indicators allow for an analysis of 
the influence of inflation on growth while isolating it from the effect of other shocks. 
The numbers in parentheses indicate that after taking into account the effect of fiscal 
and monetary policy and the export performance, the existence of causality of a 
negative sign from inflation to economic growth becomes more apparent. The null 
hypothesis that inflation does not help to improve the prediction of the future growth 
rate is clearly rejected in all cases. The statistic associated with the sum of the 
coefficients of the inflation lags is negative in all cases and statistically significant 
in most of them 11. 
Although the results of these causality tests are not fully conclusive, their 
importance is enhanced if we compare them with some similar tests relating growth 
to other variables such as investment in physical and human capital or public 
spending. Several recent attempts to corroborate the statistical causality from 
investment in physical capital to growth and incomeJ2 have concluded that, even 
though it cannot be rejected that a high rate of current investment could be explained 
by rapid growth in the past, the existence of causality in the opposite direction is far 
less conclusive. Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zejan (1 996) show that growth always 
precedes investment, rather than the other way round. A similar result is obtained by 
31 In eight out of ten cases at a 10% significance level and in six of them at the 
5% level. 
.Il Correlations which are among the main findings of the empirics of 
convergence. 
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Carrol and Weil ( 1 993) for the OECD sample. Andres, Bosca and Domenech (\996) 
also find that investment does not help to improve the prediction of income nor of 
its growth rate in practically any of the specifications studied. Moreover, when 
investment appears to cause income, the negative sign makes this result hard to 
interpret. A similar effect is obta"ined in relation to other determinants of growth, like 
the rate of schooling among others. What these authors find is that most of the 
observed positive correlation among investment and growth (or income) can be 
attributed to reverse causation." Reasoning on similar grounds, many authors suspect 
that something of this kind might be behind the correlation among inflation and 
growth (Kochedakota ( 1 996». 
Interestingly enough, unlike what happens with investment and schooling, in 
this case the causality running from income growth to inflation is indeed significant 
but with a sign that weakens, rather than strengthens, the case for reverse causality. 
As can be seen in Table 9, causality from growth to inflation is not rejected in any 
of the 50 specifications analyzed, thus we may conclude that current growth rates 
help to explain the future course of the inflation rate. The t statistic of the long-run 
coefficient is always positive and significantly so (at the 5 per cent significance 
level) in 90 per cent of the cases)). Economic theory proposes several explanations 
why rapid growth is associated with higher inflation in the more or less immediate 
future. On the one hand, it could be a movement along a negatively sloped Phillips 
curve, as prices respond after a period of rapid expansion in demand. Another 
interpretation is derived from the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect". According 
to these authors, rapid economic growth is associated with rapid expansion in the 
productivity of a country's tradeable goods sector, in tum leading to an appreciation 
of its currency. Insofar as the nominal exchange rate is not adjusted to produce this 
appreciation, domestic prices will grow faster. This leading correlation of a positive 
II Again, the results are even more clear-cut if we focuss in the specifications 
with the largest set of additional regressors. In all those ten cases, the null hypothesis 
of non-causality is rejected and the sum of the inflation lags is positive and 
significant. 
J4 Balassa ( 1 964) and Samuelson ( 1 964). 
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sign indicates that the risk of a simultaneity downward bias in the estimation of 
inflation costs is considerable1s. As a result, the contemporaneous correlation in the 
convergence equations could be regarded as a lower bound of the costs of inflation, 
which would have to be adjusted upwards in absolute value. 
In the light of this evidence, the results presented in this section have an 
unequivocal interpretation. The current rate of inflation provides relevant information 
on income prospects in DECO countries. In particular, ceteris paribus, higher 
inflation never anticipates a higher level of income in the medium and long run. This 
effect is robust to alternative specifications and, most notably, survives even when 
accumulation rates and individual effects are included among the set of regressors. 
Moreover, it can be rejected that this leading correlation between inflation and 
income is spurious and produced by the coincidence of inflationary tendencies and 
slow growth in some economies. Therefore, even though the magnitude of the 
negative effect of inflation might be questioned, the results of this section tell us that 
inflation does not appear to be neutral in the long run and that in no case does the 
persistence of inflationary tensions favour rapid economic growth in the future. 
VI. Concluding remarks. 
In this paper we have tried to assess the long-run costs of inflation, within 
an explicit theoretical framework stemming from the growth literature: the 
convergence equation. Despite its shortcomings, this approach is well-suited to test 
the robustness of the correlation between growth and inflation in low-inflation 
economies with reasonably well-working markets, such as the OECD ones during the 
1 960-1992 period. The specific results are described at length in each section and 
will not be repeated here. The main finding is that current inflation has never been 
found to be positively correlated with income per capita over the long run. 
3S Andres, Hernando and Kriiger ( 1996) show that when observations under fixed 
exchange rates are excluded ITom the sample, the size and the significance level of 
the coefficient of inflation in DECO convergence equations increase substantially. 
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In fact, in most, though admittedly not in all, specifications tried we obtained 
a significant negative correlation between inflation and income growth during rather 
long periods. This negative correlation survives the presence of additional regressors, 
such as the investment rate, population growth and schooling rates, and the 
imposition of the theoretical restrictions implied by the constant returns of 
technology. What is most remarkable is that the negative coefficient of inflation in 
growth equations remains significant even after allowing for country-specific time­
invariant effects in the equations. This is striking since, as it is well known in the 
empirical growth literature, few regressors in convergence equations withstand the 
explanatory power of country dummies. The analysis of causaHty gives less clear-cut 
resuits, but it is also noteworthy that causality from inflation to growth is always 
significant and never positive. Again, this result shows up more clearly whenever the 
influence of country dummies, accumulation rates and the effect of other 
macroeconomic variables is controlled for. 
Inflation not only reduces the level of investment but also the efficiency with 
which productive factors are used. It has a negative temporary impact upon long­
tenn growth rates, which, in tum, generates a pennanent fall of income per capita. 
Our results suggest that the marginal cost of inflation diminishes with the inflation 
rate. The estimated benefit of a pennanent reduction of inflation by one percentage 
point depends on the starting level of inflation. Thus, reducing the inflation rate from 
(say) 20% to 19% may increase output by 0.5% in the long-run. This benefit 
increases with further reductions in inflation and might be "twice as large when 
inflation reaches a low 5%. These benefits seem to be lower than others reported in 
the literature, but some evidence suggests that they might be underestimated since 
there is a positive causation running from growth to inflation, in particular for 
economies with fixed exchange rates. It must also be noticed that these estimates are 
obtained in models displaying a fast convergence rate, so that the present value of 
the benefits of disinflation might be quite sizeable. Overall, these results indicate that 
the long-run costs of inflation are non-negligible and that efforts to keep inflation 
under control will sooner or later pay off in terms of better long-run perfonnance 
and higher per capita income. 
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TABLE I. LINEAR MODELS 
(equation [5']) 
( I )  (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Ily Ily y' y' 
ljr" 0.348 ·0.241 2.314 ·1 .044 
(8.68) (1 .08) (25.49) (0.96) 
ljr, ·0.010 ·0.0 1 0  0.076 0.050 
(3.35) (3.08) (5 22) (3.41 )  
ljr, ·0.073 ·0.089 
(4.40) (5.08) 
ljr, 0.045 0.161 
( 1 .97) (1 .44) 
ljr, 0.030 0.630 
( 1 .02) (4.78) 
ljr, ·0.123 ·0.052 
( 1 .66) (0.14) 
ljr. ·0.002 ·0.001 -0.024 ·0.01 4  
(2.94) ( 1 .73) (8.50) (4.34) 
R' 0.30 0.36 0.37 0.52 
" 0.055 0.053 0.299 0.259 
Notes: 
-Estimation method: instrumental variables. Instruments: constant, trend and first and 
second order lags of the regressors and second lag of the dependent variable. 
-Absolute t-ratios in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2, NON-LINEAR MODELS 
(equation [5)) 
( I )  (2) (3) (4) 
Oep. variable y' /J.y /J.y /J.y 
ll' -2.22 
(2.46) 
n' -4.09 -1.97 -0.1 9  
(2.84) (1 .61)  (0. 13) 
a 0.09 0.27 0.23 0.35 
( 1 .3 1 )  (2.87) (2.56) (3.45) 
Y 0.31 0.27 0.21 0.1 1  
(6.30) (3.18) (2.54) ( 1 . 13) 
4>" 0.051 
(3.35) 
4>, -1).09 -0.05 -1).05 
(2.57) (1 .79) (1 .91) 
<1>' 0.005 
(2.10) 
�, -1).01 3  -0.01 1  -0.025 -0.22 
(4.00) (2.03) (3.95) (2.38) 
l. 0.027 0.032 0.031 
R..' 0.50 
Rc' 0.37 0.39 0.27 
G. 0.266 
G, 0.053 0.050 0.057 
Notes: 
·Estimation method: see notes in Table 1 .  
-Absolute t-ratios in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3. CONVERGENCE EQUATION WITH 
INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS 
•• 
., 
R' 
.,(L1) 
.,(HI-ICL) 
(equation [S']) 
Dependent variable .6. y 
( I )  
-0.26 
( 1 .22) 
-0.01 
(2.96) 
-0.08 
(S.IS) 
O.OS 
(2.34) 
-0.16 
(2.34) 
-0.001 
( 1 .90) 
0.36 
0.OS3 
(2) 
I.S4 
(2.03) 
0.04 
(3.16) 
-O.6S 
(4.70) 
-0.16 
(I .S4) 
-0.0 19 
(0.28) 
-0.21 
(0.98) 
-0.001 
( 1 . 16) 
O.3S 
0.OS4 
-0.008 
(2.01 )  
-0.001 
(0.84) 
-0.002 
( 1 .83) 
(3) 
1 . 1 8  
(6.44) 
0.03 
(3.26) 
-0.48 
(S.44) 
-0.002 
(2.29) 
0.50 
0.047 
(4) 
1.24 
(2.9S) 
0.02 
(3.04) 
-0.43 
(S.4S) 
-0.03 
(0.84) 
-0.010  
(0.2S) 
-0.007 
(0.07) 
-0.002 
(2.47) 
0.48 
0.048 
-0.01 1  
(S.18) 
-0.001 
(0.87) 
-0.002 
(1 .88) 
(S) 
1 .07 
(3.22) 
0.02 
(3.26) 
-0.40 
(6.99) 
-0.04 
( 1 .24) 
-0.02 
(0.70) 
-0.007 
(0. 1 1 )  
-0.003 
(3.99) 
0.48 
0.048 
·111: l'I"3.mplc of 6 ("'ulm!ril'S with the innation ralc above the DECO average; LI: OECO excluding HI 
countries; III-leI.: a<; III. excluding Iceland. 
-Estimation method 001. (1) :  random effects (instrumental variables); 
Instruments: 1i�1 and second lags of the regressors. 
-Estimation method cols. (2HS): Counlry..diJmmics instrumental variables; 
Instruments: as in Table 1 plus country dummies and innalion variability. 
-Dummy variables included: 
-Column. .. (2) and (3): one for each country cxccp! AUSlta1ia. 
-Column (4): one fOll'ach of the following countries: Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Spain. United 
Kingdom. CiI'l'Cu." Ireland. Iceland. Luxembourg. NcwZca1and. Portugal, Turkey and United Slates. 
-Column (5), one for each of the following countries: Spain, Greece and Turkey and one for each 
of the following country grou{lS: Ireland and Portugal; Canada and Gennany; Switzerland, 
I. uxemhourg. Iceland an lJnilro Slalcs; and New Zealand and United Kingdom. 
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NOTES: 
TABLE 4. LINEARITY OF THE INFLATION EFFECT 
Elasticities of income with respect to inflation in estimates of the 
linear version of the convergence equation 
A. Whole sample estimates with specific inflation coefficients 
Low inflationl1l -0.091 
Medium inflationfll 
High inflation!" 
B. Sub-sample estimates 
Low inflationC21 
High inflation{2} 
Very low inflation(3J 
Very high inflation(1) 
(2.33) 
-0.061 
(2.58) 
.{).066 
(4.23) 
.{).052 
(2.59) 
.{).034 
(2.15) 
-0.036 
( 1 .82) 
-0.046 
( 1 .6 1 )  
-Estimation method: see notes in Table 2. 
-Absolute !-ratios in parentheses. 
-( I )  Low inflation: observations with inflation lower than 6%; Medium inflation: observations 
with inflation between 6% and J 2%; High inflation: observations with inflation greater than 
12%. 
-(2) Low inflation: countries with average inflation lower than the median; High inflation: 
countries with average inflation greater than the median. 
-(3) Very low inflation: eight countries with the lowest inflation. Very high inflation: eight 
countries with the highest mflation. 
-
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TABLE 5: LONG RUN EFFECT OF INFLATION ON PER CAPITA INCOMEo,. 
MODELt2I OECD OECD (Ex. Iceland) 
Low'I) 
7t Highc.) 1t Lowm 1t High(·} 1t 
n, '" 0.80% 0.40% 1 . 10% 0.60% 
ro( I +n) 0.45% 0.30% 0.70% 0.50% 
log(n) 2.00% 0.30% 2.20% 0.40% 
n 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 
NOTES: 
-(I) The long run effect is calculated as the coefficient of inflation divided by the 
coefficient on initial income in the convergence equation augmented with country 
dummies. 
-(2) The variables in the first column indicate the way in which inflation enters 
in each model. 
-(3) Low 11: reducing inflation from 4% to 3% 
-(4) High 1t: reducing inflation from 20% to 19% 
-Initial GOP non instrumented. 
TABLE 6: PER CAPITA INCOME GAIN FROM REDUCING 
INFLATION: STEADY·STATE AND PRESENT VALUE. 
Basic model Country effects 
Steady-state per capita income gain 2.5% 0.75% 
A 2.5% 13% 
Half-life per capita income gain 1 .25% 0.375% 
(30 years) (7 years) 
Present value: discount rate 4% ( J )  0.32% 0.29% 
Present value: discount rate 5% (l) 0.23% 0.27% 
NOTE: 
( I )  Discounted present value of half-life gain (expressed in percentage points 
of steady state per capita income) 
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TABLE 7. INFLATION EFFECT FOR DIFFERENT PERIODS 
Coefficients of inflation In a linear version of the convergence equation(l) 
NOTES: 
A. Demand shocks predominance period!!) 
OLS 
B. Supply shocks predominance period(1) 
OLS 
-0.002 
(2.33) 
-0.003 
(2.52) 
-0.004 
(3.85) 
-0.003 
(2.14) 
-(Il Equation [5'J excluding the trend. 
-(2 Demand shocks predominance period: 1961-1972 and 1 989-1992. Supply shocks 
predominance period: 1973-1988, 
-(3) Instruments: constant, first and second order lags of the regressors and second lag of the 
dependent variable. 
-Absolute Hatios in parentheses. 
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TABLE 8: CAUSALITY FROM INFLATION TO PER CAPITA INCOME'" 
Causality')) 
Non-causalityUl 
Notes: 
Significant at 
the 5% level 
1 5(6) 
--
NEGATIVE(2) 
Significant at a level 
between 5% and 10% 
10(2) 
-
POSITIVE(2) 
Non-
significant 
22(2) -
3(0) -
-(I) Each cell represents the number of specifications in that case. In parentheses, the 
number of specifications corresponding to the model with individual effects, lagged 
accumulation rates and lagged macroeconomic indicators. 
-(2) Sign of the I-statistic for the sum of the coefficients of the inflation lags. 
-(3) Causality (non-causality): The null hypothesis that the inflation coefficients are 
jointly non-significant is (is not) rejected at the 5% level. 
TABLE 9: CAUSALITY FROM GROWTH TO INFLATION''' 
CausalitY, ) 
Non-causalitYll 
Notes: See Table 8. 
NEGATIVE'" 
-
-
Non-
significant 
3(0) 
-
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POSITIVE(2) 
Significant at a level Significant at 
between 5% and 10% 5% level 
2(0) 45(10) 
-
-
CHART 1 :  SENSITIVITY OF THE INFLATION COEFFICIENT (1) 
TO THE SAMPLE DEFINITION 
Basic Model 
0.02 0.02 
O f---'"-..,---=,�--_--------------{ O 
-ll.02 -ll.02 
-ll.04 - -ll.04 
-ll.06 -- -ll.oe 
-ll.OB - -ll.OB 
-ll.1  - -ll.1 
-ll. 1 2  L..L __ -'-_---' __ -'--__ '--_-'-__ -'-_-' __ -'-' -ll.1 2  
2 3 
Notes: 
4 5 6 
Sample deflnitlon (2) 
� 1'<:tl .96(sd) 
7 B 
(1) The chart depicts the estimated coefficient (u,) for inflation in model [51 
as well u the 95% confidence intervals (±1.96 standard deviation band) for 
different sample definitions. 
(2) Sample definition: 
1 .- High inflation countries (above CECO average) 
2.- High inflation countries (excluding Iceland) 
3.- 0ECD 
4.- CECO excluding Turkey 
5.- CECO excluding Turkey and Iceland 
6.- CECO excluding Turkey. Iceland and Portugal 
7.- CECD excluding Turkey, Iceland, Portugal and Greece 
8.- CECO excluding Turkey. Iceland, Portugal, Greece and Spain 
9.- Low Inftation countries (below aECD average) 
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CHART 2: SENSITIVITY OF THE INFLATION COEFFICIENT (1) 
TO THE SAMPLE DEFINITION 
Country dummies (restricted model) 
0,005 0,005 
0 �-2����=------------------------- -1 0 
-0,005 -0,005 
-0,01 -0,01 
-0,015 -0,015 
-0,02 '-'--____ -L-__ ----"'--__ ---L ____ -L-__ ----"'--__ ---L ____ -L-____ '-' -0,02 
2 3 
Notes: 
4 5 6 
Sample definition (2) 
� 1',:!:1 :!!Ei�.d) 
7 8 
(1) The chart depicts the estimated coefficient (.u,) for inflatkm In mod.1 (5] 
as well as the 95% confidence intervals (±1.96 standard deviation band) for 
different sample definitions. 
(2) Sampl. dafinttion: 
1.- High inflation countries (abow eECD average) 
2.- High inflation countries (excluding Iceland) 
3,- OECD 
4.- OECD excluding Turkey 
5,- OECD excluding Turkey and Iceland 
6.- OECD excluding Turkey, Iceland and Portugal 
7.- CECD excluding Turkey, Iceland, Portugal and Gr .. ce 
B.- oeco excluding Turkey, Iceland, Portugal, Greece and Spain 
9.- Low inflation countries (below CECD average) 
-39-
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